

ABSTRACT

AMBIGUITIES: SOME JAPANESE ACCOUNTS OF AUSTRALIA

Japanese and Australians have shared in an intense curiosity about each other throughout our recent histories. From Japanese reports about Australia emerge interesting suggestions about how the Japanese observe themselves. In what Japanese say about Australia, curiosity about difference and the impulse to compare are as potent as in Australian accounts of them. Early impressions of Australia remain enduringly influential for today's Japanese. It is at times when those images undergo revision that their power is most demonstrable. Such change-moments, discussed in the paper, include the advent of Pauline Hanson and the Asian economic crisis, the Sydney Olympic Games, and the *Tampa* event. Australia has an image-problem in Japan, to which we have contributed by recent policies and by underestimating the need to change both reality and perception.

PAPER

[*Start with acronym anecdote:* A report on Japanese perceptions of Australia in 1990 by the *Age* cited 'LLL' as a Japanese acronym for Australia: 'large, lucky and lazy'. Along with Singapore and San Francisco, Sydney was one of the three desirable holiday places for Japanese: 'SSS'.¹ A Japanese Ambassador in 1992 joked that Australia's high points were known in Japan as 'RR' (rock and reef) and 'KK' (koalas and kangaroos). In 1995 he told a Japanese reporter that large numbers of unemployed Australians were moving to Brisbane, where they could live comfortably on high unemployment benefits.² Australia, it appears, has an image problem in Japan, but that doesn't mean that all Japanese images of Australia are inaccurate.]

Japanese and Australians have shared in an intense curiosity about each other throughout our recent histories. As is well known, settlers from Europe brought with them to Australia preconceptions about Japan, some fanciful, some factual. Some of the convicts set out in boats and some got to Batavia, while others reached the coast of Japan. Their curiosity was matched by small teams of entertainers, prostitutes, divers, officials, and other diligent Japanese who travelled to Australia in the nineteenth century. The process of mutual exploration continues into the 21st century.

To investigate how Australia appears from other points of view, and particularly those of people in two societies of such significance to each other, is to challenge Australian self-perceptions. But equally, from Japanese reports about Australia emerge

interesting suggestions about how the Japanese observe themselves. In what Japanese say about Australia, curiosity about difference and the impulse to compare are as potent as in Australian accounts of them. In this investigation, a kind of double vision is at work, with Australian self-representations sometimes influencing, and at other times contradicting, Japanese images of Australia.

My research on this subject formally began in 1995, when I considered Japanese accounts of Australia as part of my PhD thesis, which led to my book *About Face: Asian Accounts of Australia* (Scribe, 2003). From 1999 to 2003 I worked with a team of linguists investigating Japanese and Chinese 'Australiana' in the collections of the National Library of Australia. Our results from that project are to appear next year in *Double Vision: Asian Accounts of Australia* (Pandanus, 2004). My approach throughout has been not to conduct opinion surveys of my own, but to draw upon those done by others (Neville Meaney and others 1988, Ross Garnaut 1989, Ross Mouer 1991, 1992, Kyoko Sheridan 1992, and several government publications). I have concentrated on views expressed by 'opinion leaders' — people of some authority in government, the media, and the academy, and writers of fact and fiction whose views are widely accessible to the Japanese public. I should remark here that in comparing Chinese and Japanese accounts of Australia, we found lots of recent fiction by Chinese about Australia, but almost no comparable Japanese narratives.

Australia was an early participant in East Asian commercial affairs, and the attractions of access to trade and territory are what drive most early Japanese accounts of Australia. As soon as Japanese were permitted to travel abroad in 1867, they set off for Australia: first popular performers, then seamen, pearl divers, and prostitutes; sugar workers and rice farmers; ship owners, storekeepers, and even a succession of medical practitioners in Broome; and eventually founders of trading houses like Kanematsu Goshō. To preserve 'national honour', the Japanese authorities tried to screen the emigrants and give them information on Western customs, lest they cause offence through ignorance.

A diary written by Hashimoto Masato in 1875 was a precursor of many Japanese accounts of Australia as a wide, empty land inhabited by exotic animals, strange native

people, and European settlers taking advantage of its wealth. He described naked Aborigines 'like the black devil *Rasetsu* one sees in pictures'. But he also observed the crowds of 'pitiable' Chinese sojourners who were his fellow passengers, behaving 'just like...animals', implying his superiority as a Japanese government official. Australians and everything Australian he termed 'English'. He recorded the high level of courtesy with which he and his colleagues were received, and their mutual expectations of material benefit. Hashimoto's team member Sakata Haruo in 1879 warned Tokyo that 'the white people' might reap the advantages of two-way trade unless Japan got in quickly with its own shipping.

Early interest was stimulated in the opportunities that two opposed climates offered for complementary trade and for a shipping line. But Japan and Australia soon became bogged down in decades of contention about the access that Australia would permit for Japanese people and goods to the continent and its market. They endure to this day, although they have changed direction. In Prime Minister W.M. Hughes' assertions of race-based sovereignty, we discover word-for-word echoes of in Howard's pronouncements on refugees and asylum seekers, and more resonances in his pragmatic, xenophobic interpretation of the national interest. Australians alone, said Hughes, will decide who 'should enter in' to this country. Australians, says Howard, will decide who comes into this country and the circumstances under which they come. Hughes was notorious in Japan in 1919, and the White Australia policy for much longer. A Japanese delegate at the first meeting of the Institute of Pacific Relations in 1925 said that the 'harsh and uncompromising attitude' of Australians in 1919 was still remembered. Australia had no regard for the sensibilities of other nations and had taken 'no trouble to avoid giving unnecessary offence'. To Japanese the typical Australian was, he said, Mr W. M. Hughes. Japan itself scarcely welcomes foreign settlers in large numbers, then or now, to its crowded islands. A theme often repeated in Japanese accounts of Australia, that still provides a rationale for this double standard, is that Japan is small and narrow, while Australia is wide and has 'abundant nature' and resources. One does not welcome migrants, while the other seeks them. The latest reiteration of the theme is in this year's movie, *Japanese Story*.

From the 1850s, opinion leaders planned to set up overseas colonies of Japanese again, as their forebears had briefly done in the early seventeenth century.

They wanted an empire, modelled on that of the British in India, China, Southeast Asia, and Australia. Migrants should be sent south, some said, with military support, before it was too late, 'lest the white people get all the trade'. Who would the colonists be? In the 1780s, the Tokugawa had considered sending 70 000 of Japan's hereditary outcasts to develop Hokkaido. Criminals had long been sent to Sado Island to work the goldmines, and the Tokugawa had banished its political enemies there too. From the late 1880s, proposals were entertained to send either 'criminals' or *burakumin*, the so-called 'new commoners', overseas to establish smaller Japans. It was their duty as citizens to go (said the *Yomiuri* newspaper in 1886) and to send remittances back to benefit the home country. Many went to South America and Hawaii, and between 1932 and 1945 nearly 300 000 Japanese migrated to Manchuria.³ Well aware that Britain had a convict colony in New South Wales, some thought of sending prisoners and *burakumin* to be Japan's Australian colonists. The observation that Australia was founded by convicts, which recurs in most Japanese textbook representations of Australia, seems to recall this speculation.

It pleased Japanese observers of Australia in the late nineteenth century to be able to displace condescending Western stereotypes of themselves as childlike, 'young Japan' onto Australia, representing it as immature. Britain, they wrote, had learnt a lesson in its American colonies, and was shrewdly preventing Australia from growing up and acquiring a strong navy or arms industry. If Australia could shed British domination, it could join Japan in controlling future Pacific trade. But as Australia moved to restrict Japanese migration, enthusiasm for these prospects cooled: 'The Japanese actually feel more rejected in Australia than they do in America', wrote Inagaki Manjiro in 1891.⁴ Increasingly frustrated by the West's unequal treaties and barriers to migration, Japanese began to cite their grievances, to assert their right to settle abroad, and to demand independence for the Philippines, Samoa, and the New Hebrides, as well as Australia. The views of some Southeast Asian leaders in the 1950-80s, if not modelled on Japan's, were similar.

Japan's dispute with Australia over migration from 1897 to 1921 was copiously documented in the Japanese Diplomatic Record Office. The White Australia policy was referred to in almost every Japanese book about Australia from 1901 until the Pacific War, as Henry Frei's copious research showed in 1991. Japanese officials considered,

accurately enough, that Australia supported the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1911 out of 'fear, not friendship'. Australia, they reported, had caught *kyonichibyō* ('fear-of-Japan illness') since the Russo-Japanese war. 'Fear of Japan entered into it... As soon as we were victorious they came to fear that we would invade Australia... They fear Japan in the way that you fear a bogeyman in the dark because you cannot see the natural phenomena around you.'⁵

As equality with the West and hegemony over other Asians came within Japan's reach, demands for racial equality grew louder. By the 1920s, Japanese were protesting against 'unendurable humiliations'. The *Gaimusho* published two documents in 1921, one written at the Consulate-General in Sydney. They expressed concern about Australia's official restrictions on Japanese workers, but reported that personal relations with settler Australians were warm. They predicted an era of Australian fearfulness and protectionism, however, and warned that the White Australia policy would add to difficulties with Japan. The *Japan Daily Mail* explained that Australians were 'an imperial race' who feared that if 'ungovernable multitudes of Japanese subjects'—criminals or outcasts, perhaps—arrived in Australia, it could lead to a 'lamentable degradation of race'.

Although the Domei newsagency admitted Japan's knowledge of Australia was 'insufficient', it declared in 1939 that Australia's attitudes to Japan were 'childish'.⁶ Australians were described in several Japanese reports as degenerate ex-convicts living in a 'fools' paradise', obsessed with a 'crazy idea' that Japan was bent on southward advance—which, by then, it was.⁷ Japanese anger grew when the United States began to impose economic sanctions in the 1930s. Australia's 'trade diversion' actions in 1936, responding to British pressure, and its rescinding of the agreement for an iron ore mine at Yampi Sound, were taken in Japan as evidence that Australia would support British interests even to the detriment of its own. The fact that Australian banks and investors were so nervous about any but British and American clients strengthened Japan's righteous outrage. Underpopulated, underdeveloped Australia seemed to have retreated into relying on Anglo-kinship; its manufacturers were timid and uncompetitive; and its exports were badly packaged and of poor quality. Then, in 1939, Menzies declared that 'the British countries of the world must stand or fall together' and in the same year, Japan proclaimed 'Asia for the Asiatics'.

Among many interesting Japanese accounts of Australia in the pre-Pacific war years are those that urge Australians to become part of Asia, and the novels that anticipate Japanese occupation of Australia. An Australia *bumu* (boom) of fiction and fact began in the 1930s, some themes of which—copiously surveyed by Henry Frei in 1991—would recur in Japanese publications long after the war. Some novels as early as 1933 anticipated such events as the defeat of Singapore, and surprise attacks on the north coast of Australia. Invasion of Australia by Japan was justifiable because Australia was said to have a vast territory to which it would admit not a single Japanese migrant. Such inequality between ‘status quo’ powers and ‘have not’ nations, several writers warned, could lead to a ‘Greater East Asia war’. Many called on Australia to identify with the Asia-Pacific region as it had been before the British invasion. Others urged Australia—the ‘orphan of the South Pacific’—to wake up to its true identity and restore the old unity. Some proposed an Australasian Mediterranean (*Go-A chichukai*) of diverse cultures, unified by geography and ethnology. Japanese writers found various expressions for this new unity, calling Australia a South Asian (‘Austral-Asian’) country, a Pacific Ocean country, and even a Pacific country in the East Asian region. Their main claim was that Australia belonged in the GEACPS. Australia needed the Sphere as much as the Sphere needed Australia, a Kanematsu Goshō survey declared in 1942, adding that Australia had always been part of Asia. One writer proposed a long-range plan to create an Asia–Australia Co-Prosperity Sphere (*A-Go kyoeiken*).

A Japanese official proposal of 1941 envisaged sending three million Chinese to develop Australia, ousting the ‘British’ through competition, and installing a civilian governor-general. In a policy document drafted at the end of 1942, Australia was listed among the second tier of countries in the GEACPS, along with most of Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. Two million Japanese, it was proposed, would be living in Australia and New Zealand by 1950 in *Nippon machi* (‘Japan towns’), where they would be role models, instructing Australians and New Zealanders in agriculture. They were not to intermarry: the report warned that mixed-blood children were inferior and that intermarriage would destroy the purity of the Yamato race. Another report in 1943 put forward a variant of this, proposing that the White Australia policy be abolished, and that Chinese, Indians, Germans, and Italians should be sent as migrants to Australia, as well as ten million Japanese farmers. Preferably, the Japanese should be allocated a region

of their own to develop in north Queensland. Novelists went further and imagined events after they had done so.⁸

Propaganda imagery reinforced impressions of Japan's rightful superiority over Australia. In an *anime* film released in April 1945, *Momotarō: Divine Troops of the Ocean*, the well-known fable of the demon-oppressing Peach-Boy and his noble animal friends was reinterpreted to propose the coming liberation of the simple, good hearted people of South and Southeast Asia, among whom it implicitly included Australians. The Americans and British were shown as ineffectual but human figures, while the inhabitants of the *namban* were represented as unruly jungle creatures. They included kangaroos.

The Japanese attack on Sydney Harbour in 1942 and the experiences of the crew of the three midget submarines reverse our customary perspective of the event, and reveal how propaganda makes the enemy faceless and inhuman in order to justify the attack. Another Japanese wartime account of Australia in 1944 says Australians have a reputation for violence that derives from their being accustomed as children to killing animals, using guns, and training wild horses, as well as the fact that they are the descendants of convicts. For these writers, for different reasons, Australia is seen as a remote, dangerous, frontier place, populated by uncivilised people, which East Asians enter at their peril. The implication is that Japanese have a duty to go there and civilise the Australians. Much the same arguments are used today when United States leaders seek to justify their plans for war.⁹

Three big bangs resounded over the Asia-Pacific hemisphere in the first half of the twentieth century: Japan's victory over Russia in 1905, Japan's attack on Pearl Harbour in 1941, and the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. Each one, in its way, was ignited by Western countries' attempts to put Japan in a racially inferior place, and Japan's refusal to stay there. Many Japanese, as Ian Buruma observed in 1994, continue to blame Americans, the West, or all white people for the sequence of events that began in 1854.¹⁰ After the Pacific War, among Japanese who had lived with the propaganda and had been afflicted by the West's insults, trade embargoes and migration restrictions, to say nothing of bomb attacks, the conviction persisted that their cause had been just. Many saw themselves not as aggressors but as

the victims of the West. Some believed the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were attempts at genocide planned by white racists or Jews. Early representations of Australians as semi-independent people who fought in their allies' wars, who discriminated against Japanese and their exports, and feared Japan but could not appreciate its subtlety and uniqueness, persisted throughout the century. Japan's ambition to lead Asia did not die; its need for markets and raw materials grew; and predictions that 'one Japanese way of thinking' would be reborn were still current in some circles in 1964.¹¹

In the 1970s, speculation about Australia as a site for settlements of Japanese reappeared with the Yeppoon development, and in the 1980s with the Silver Columbia proposal. In another guise, the 'colonising' project reappeared in the 1980s–1990s as the multifunctionpolis project, which was similarly unsuccessful. As Japan's economy, self-esteem, and international standing recovered, so did representations of Australia as having little apart from its natural endowments to offer Japan. Australians' frequent ineptitude in negotiation and image-promotion, imperviousness to subtle warnings, and failure to understand their proper place again lost them marks with their Japanese interlocutors. Even in the late 1990s, when Japan was facing major economic and political problems, the process continued. In spite of official claims to the contrary, Australia's status and influence in Japan were much lower than a century earlier.¹²

A major new source of Japanese accounts of Australia is war brides, some of whose experiences were not collected and published until recent years by Tamura Keiko (1999, 2001), Atsumi Reiko (1992) and others. They show how women who knew little about Australia were often disillusioned, but how important it was for them to preserve their uniqueness as Japanese. Other Japanese in Australia, even those who were permanent residents, were statistically more reluctant than other Asia-born migrants to become Australian citizens. Satō Machiko, who had lived in Australia for 27 years, explained in 2001 that being Japanese is believed to be unique, untranslatable, and a source of great pride. Japanese who live abroad or marry foreigners encounter resentment from their compatriots as a result. Since Japanese nationality is a superior birthright, while it might be to other Asians' advantage to become Australian citizens, it is seen as a sacrifice, a step down, for Japanese. But the war brides, because of their dire circumstances, had less to lose in becoming Australians than did Japanese men.

As the post-war complementary trading relationship flourished, and Japan rose to become the world's second largest economy, the comparison with Australia became more invidious. Comments about Australian laziness and inefficiency recur in Japanese accounts of Australia from the 1980s. According to some business people, the serious work of the day is done in Australia only after 5 pm. But underlying these observations about the way Australians divide their time between work and leisure, together with commentaries on the relative autonomy of Australian school children, and the comparative equality of gender roles, are long-standing concerns in Japan. Some worry about rigidities in Japanese society, and about lifetimes of hard work that may not be fulfilling, not matter how sophisticated the possessions they deliver. Others see the young losing respect for the traditional values that have sustained Japan's success.

Few of the Japanese businessmen surveyed by Meaney and others (1988) recognised in Australia any distinctive values or culture, apart from the White Australia policy. They mentioned 'rustic, naïve, easygoing, open, generous, good-natured, and pioneering' as Australian qualities: characteristics they did not associate with Americans, nor with Japanese. The resilience of such representations is demonstrated even by several Japanese writers who set out explicitly to dispense with stereotypes of Australia, but who actually reinforce them with the expected narratives: the simple life, mateship, the large dry land, native animals, Aborigines, culture shock, and—for women—the trials of living and raising children abroad and finding fulfilment in life. In 1983, one in five Japanese in a survey reported by Tada Masayo regarded Australia as a 'semi-advanced' country. By 1992, although Australia was claiming 'enmeshment with Asia', that response had risen to 70 per cent.¹³ A recurrent theme in Japanese media commentary about Australia, one not used about other countries, was *katamoi*, 'unrequited love', the response of a superior to the persistent advances of an inferior. The expression was used frequently in *Asahi* articles about Australia in the 1970s and 1980s, referring to the frequent visits of Australian Federal and State ministers and the infrequent Japanese visits the other way. By using the expressions *moderu* (go up to the capital) and *dekakeru* (go out from it), the journalist Aoki implied the relationship of ruler and vassal that readers would associate with feudal Japan or China.

Later Japanese observers have cited Australia as a useful example for their own country, in multiculturalism and settlement of refugees for example, and if offering freedom to women. Sugimoto Yoshio, who like his wife Satō Machiko, has written and broadcast many commentaries on Australia from the viewpoint of Japanese for some 30 years, is a contributor to as well as an analyst of perceptions of Australia in Japan. But he says that the segment of the Japanese audience with an interest in Australia remains small. Two assumptions are widespread among them: that Japanese businesspeople are more stressed and tense than Australians, and that Japanese society is less multicultural than Australia. These are among the considerations documented by Satō Machiko, that lead Japanese 'lifestyle migrants', particularly women, to migrate to Australia. At ANU, Masayo Tada further divides gender-related perceptions of Australia into three groups: Japanese businessmen, who pity and scorn the uxorious 'Australian husband'; married women, who generally prefer educational practices and gender equality in Australia to those in Japan; and single mothers, for whom Australia provides comparative liberation. But Sugimoto draws attention to the change in Australia since 1996. As a result of Pauline Hanson, the *Tampa* affair, and Australia's support of the attack on Iraq, he says many Japanese no longer see Australia as a successful multicultural society.

These contemporary accounts are rarely without their down-side, and most include warnings that the Australian way is far from perfect. Some Japanese-language accounts adopt an almost conspiratorial or confessional tone, as though the writers were passing on home truths about Australia to readers of the vernacular which, if they were writing in English, they might have been more circumspect in expressing. It is clear that early impressions of Australia remain enduringly influential for today's Japanese. Many descriptions are so similar that they seem either to have been based on the same sources, or to result from preconceptions that existed even before the observers arrived in Australia, and that were readily confirmed by what they saw. It is often almost obligatory to affirm readers' expectations by commenting on Australia's Westernness or Britishness, its small population, wide open spaces, 'high sky', agriculture, exotic animals, and the leisured lifestyle of Australians, before getting down to anything more original. Japanese accounts of women's experiences in Australia are almost as numerous as studies of Aboriginal communities, and both categories they include first-

hand experiences of Japanese who have lived in Australia for extended periods, either in cities or in the outback.

While long-standing patterns of perception exist in Japanese texts, and remain powerfully influential, it is at times when those images undergo revision that their power is most demonstrable. One such change-moment occurred in 1997, when Pauline Hanson's views on Asian migration, and Australians' apparent support of them were reported in Japan as showing that our multiculturalism was not working as well as we had claimed. Simultaneously, the Asian economic crisis suggested the same about the effect of Asian values on the tiger economies. Officials advised Australia obliquely that we were losing marks in Japan's esteem, and this appears to have resulted in our loss of their support for Australia's entry to East Asian organisations. At the same time, the Australia Japan Ministerial Committee ceased to meet. Questions are now asked about whether Australians are now a militaristic people, more so than Japanese.

Watching the Games, popular author Murakami Haruki sought to provide his Japanese readers with a new account of Australian life, both wild and domestic, in *Sydney!*. To the copious detail he offered on food, and somewhat less on history, he added compliments about the real grass in the Homebush stadium, and—like Chinese commentators—about the clean and airy toilets. But Australia and the United States, he wrote, were in a 'younger and older brother' relationship: while the United States had been settled by ambitious migrants, Australia got British criminals. Australia was a blurred backdrop for his focus on Japan's athletes and Japan's much bigger sports venues. Professor Leith Morton, reading Murakami's diary of the three weeks he spent in Australia at the time of the Olympic Games, finds that he researched Australian history and society from the copious information available electronically, as well as from standard sources and the Sydney daily press. These inform Murakami's observations in *Shidonii* (2002) about anti-aboriginal racism, stolen children, and Australia's propensity to fight for Britain and America in war after war. He observes the huge, modern stadium, but also the crumbling, faded Sydney suburbs on the way to Parramatta. The criminal tendencies of Australians, resulting from their convict ancestry, are confirmed for Murakami by the theft of his expensive laptop computer from his hotel room, as they have been for Japanese readers by the 'Melbourne incident' of 1992 in which a group of

Japanese tourists were imprisoned for importing drugs, unjustly as both Australian and Japanese reports suggest. But Murakami notices a change: for him, there is a new Australian assertiveness in the air that he finds irritating. He interprets this as being officially encouraged in the Olympic crowds in order to displace Australians' guilt for their convict past and for their discrimination against Aborigines.

Even though she agrees that Australian affairs are not widely reported in East Asian capitals, Professor Tessa Morris-Suzuki observes that refugee and asylum-seeker policy has been more intensively covered in Japan than the Hanson issue was. In spite of the fact that Japan, like most countries in the region, seeks to exclude refugees, Japanese have in the past admired Australia's success in accepting them, and the reformist press has used Australia's example to press for change in Japan. The *Tampa* episode was at first reported blandly and briefly, but then the government's 'Pacific Solution' and the efforts of Melbourne lawyers to oppose it gained attention in the Japanese media. This brought about another change: the *Asahi Shimbun* wrote that tolerant Australia, which took in many more Indochinese refugees than Japan, had been transformed, and that attitudes were hardening in Australia and elsewhere. Australia, as a counter-model for Japan, is now seen by several commentators to be losing the esteem it once had.

Ambassador Satō was more forthright, declaring that he could not call what Australia had with Japan a relationship, and that Australia was not regarded as part of Asia.¹⁴ For Japanese leaders to induct Australia into the East Asia of the future would be to deny Japan's inherent superiority, either as Western or as Asian. When Australia was widely criticised in the region, and that had always been too much to expect.

These papers, and my research, show that, if it was in any doubt, perceptions are powerful in the way societies respond to each other. Long-established images may be in need of change, but when they change, it may not always be for the betterment of Australia's reputation. Australia has opportunities to be admired and even influential in Japan: because of recent changes in Australian behaviour we appear to be squandering them. Behaviour is one side of our image problem: projection is the other. David Carter argues the case for more and better Australian cultural diplomacy in Japan, and in particular for the gaps in Australian Studies to be filled. A country that does not appear to

care whether its history is well known or its culture admired risks diminishing such influence as it has in Japan. Plenty of other small and medium-sized countries are competing to have their voices heard there, and if Australian Studies are not invigorated and promoted as part of a coordinated image-improvement strategy, Australia's small voice will easily be shouted down.

¹ *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 20 June 1991.

² *Australian*, 9 March 1995.

³ Anke Scherer, 'Moving the masses: rural poverty and the village division and relocation campaign in the 1930s', *Japan Foundation Newsletter*, xxix, 2, January 2002, pp. 11–14.

⁴ Shiga Shigetaka, Hirose Takeo and Inagaki Manjiro, quoted in Frei 1991.

⁵ Japanese officials quoted in Sissons 1980. See also *Gaimushō Obeikyoku*, Pacific Issues Research Paper 3: 'White Australia policy', Tokyo, 1921.

⁶ Kinship: Tweedie, 1994. Domei Tsūshinsha, *Saikin no Goshu (Present Day Australia)*, Tokyo: Domei Tsushinsha, 1939.

⁷ Taiheiyo Kyokai, *Goshu no Shizen to Shakai (Natural Resources and Society in Australia)*, Chuo Koronsha, Tokyo, 1943.

⁸ See Frei 1991, chapter 7.

⁹ See Clyde Prestowitz, *Rogue Nation: American Unilateralism and the Failure of Good Intentions*, New York: Basic Books, 2003.

¹⁰ Buruma, *The Wages of Guilt: Memories of War in Germany and Japan*, Jonathan Cape, London.

¹¹ Hayashi Fusao, *In Affirmation of the Greater East Asian War*, 1964, quoted in Buruma 1994.

¹² See <http://www.dfat.gov.au>, May 2000: Relations with Japan.

¹³ Royama Michio, survey of area specialisation conducted for International House of Japan, 1992, quoted by Tada Masayo, 'Australian studies and area studies in Japan', ANU seminar 13 November 2000.

¹⁴ Sato Yukio, quoted by Paul Kelly, 'So close, yet so far apart', *A* 2 September 1998, p. 15.